by gill1109 » Fri Nov 19, 2021 12:52 pm
Justo wrote: ↑Fri Nov 19, 2021 4:26 am
Joy Christian wrote: ↑Thu Nov 18, 2021 7:28 am
Who cares what Bell's definitions are? Here is what I say in Footnote 7 of my paper:
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/ ... sos.180526.
The possible space-like separated events being averaged in (4.8) cannot possibly occur in any possible world, classical or quantum.
To appreciate this elementary fact, consider the following homely analogy: Imagine a couple, say Jack and Jill, who decide to separate
while in Kansas City, and travel to the West and East Coasts respectively. Jack decides to travel to Los Angeles, while Jill cannot make
up her mind and might travel to either New York or Miami. So while Jack reaches Los Angeles, Jill might reach either New York or
Miami. Thus, there are two possible destinations for the couple. Either Jack reaches Los Angeles and Jill reaches New York, or Jack
reaches Los Angeles and Jill reaches Miami. Now suppose that, upon reaching new York, Jill decides to buy either apple juice or orange
juice. And likewise, upon reaching Miami, Jill decides to buy either apple juice or orange juice. Consequently, there are following four
counterfactually possible events that can realistically occur, at least in our familiar world: (i) While Jack reaches Los Angeles and buys
apple juice, Jill reaches New York and buys apple juice; Or, (ii) while Jack reaches Los Angeles and buys apple juice, Jill reaches New
York and buys orange juice; Or, (iii) while Jack reaches Los Angeles and buys apple juice, Jill reaches Miami and buys apple juice; Or,
(iv) while Jack reaches Los Angeles and buys apple juice, Jill reaches Miami and buys orange juice. So far so good. But what is being
averaged in (4.8) are impossible events of the following kind: (v) While Jack reaches Los Angeles and buys apple juice, Jill reaches New
York and buys apple juice and Jill reaches Miami and buys orange juice at exactly the same time! Needless to say, no such events can
possibly occur in any possible world, even counterfactually. In particular, Einstein’s conception of local realism by no means demands
such absurd or impossible events in any possible world [4]. It is therefore not at all surprising why the unphysical bounds of ±2 on the
CHSH sum of expectation values obtained by averaging over the absurd events like (4.10) are not respected in the actual experiments.
.
I am sorry Richard, but I have to agree with Joy that this is absolute nonsense. Of course, Bell meant the use of counterfactual reasoning.
Joy's absurd story has got absolutely nothing to do with Bell's theorem. Bell (I refer to the mature Bell of the later works in his book "Speakable and unspeakable") made some physical assumptions, nowadays called locality, realism, and no-conspiracy. He expressed those assumptions in a mathematical form. Physicists and philosophers may debate whether or not this mathematical expression of physical and metaphysical concepts is reasonable. But once done, it is done, we may proceed with a mathematical analysis of the mathematical model which we now have before us. This is the familiar mathematical model with functions A, B and a probability measure rho with the familiar properties. From that, elementary calculus leads to the CHSH inequality. No "counterfactual reasoning" in the sense sometimes given to that phrase by philosophers is used.
Joy has given you a straw man. He confuses the issue by using an idiosyncratic definition of mean value, different from Bell's and different from modern physicists', and gets himself into a mess entirely of his own creation. (Von Mises' axiomatisation of probability was shown to have self-contradictions by Paul Lévy's student Ville in 1939, and it was superseded by Kolmogorov's 1933 measure-theoretic framework).
Meanwhile, counterfactual reasoning has had a renaissance in the modern theory of causality (led by Judea Pearl and many others). The words no longer mean what they meant decades ago in philosophy. They refer to a mathematical framework for discussing causality which is used every day in modern science. The latest Nobel prize in economics went to econometrician Guido Imbens (originally for the Netherlands) who has been promoting modern counterfactual reasoning in order to estimate/predict the effect of interventions in the economy by state actors.
Meanwhile, I checked the printer's proofs of my IEEE Access paper, commenting on Joy's first IEEE Access paper. It should be appearing very soon, and Joy really ought to get to work on a "Reply".
I'm expecting a final decision on my RSOS comment very soon. The editors have apologised for some delay due to Corona issues in London.
I guess I will soon stop following the discussions in Fred's forum. My work is done here. I will maybe get back into action when I notice some kind of journal publication (or attempt thereof) of Fred's simulation model.
[quote=Justo post_id=238 time=1637324784 user_id=62]
[quote="Joy Christian" post_id=220 time=1637249315 user_id=63]
Who cares what Bell's definitions are? Here is what I say in Footnote 7 of my paper: https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.180526.
[quote]
The possible space-like separated events being averaged in (4.8) cannot possibly occur in any possible world, classical or quantum.
To appreciate this elementary fact, consider the following homely analogy: Imagine a couple, say Jack and Jill, who decide to separate
while in Kansas City, and travel to the West and East Coasts respectively. Jack decides to travel to Los Angeles, while Jill cannot make
up her mind and might travel to either New York or Miami. So while Jack reaches Los Angeles, Jill might reach either New York or
Miami. Thus, there are two possible destinations for the couple. Either Jack reaches Los Angeles and Jill reaches New York, or Jack
reaches Los Angeles and Jill reaches Miami. Now suppose that, upon reaching new York, Jill decides to buy either apple juice or orange
juice. And likewise, upon reaching Miami, Jill decides to buy either apple juice or orange juice. Consequently, there are following four
counterfactually possible events that can realistically occur, at least in our familiar world: (i) While Jack reaches Los Angeles and buys
apple juice, Jill reaches New York and buys apple juice; Or, (ii) while Jack reaches Los Angeles and buys apple juice, Jill reaches New
York and buys orange juice; Or, (iii) while Jack reaches Los Angeles and buys apple juice, Jill reaches Miami and buys apple juice; Or,
(iv) while Jack reaches Los Angeles and buys apple juice, Jill reaches Miami and buys orange juice. So far so good. But what is being
averaged in (4.8) are impossible events of the following kind: (v) While Jack reaches Los Angeles and buys apple juice, Jill reaches New
York and buys apple juice [i]and[/i] Jill reaches Miami and buys orange juice [i]at exactly the same time![/i] Needless to say, no such events can
possibly occur in any possible world, even counterfactually. In particular, Einstein’s conception of local realism by no means demands
such absurd or impossible events in any possible world [4]. It is therefore not at all surprising why the unphysical bounds of ±2 on the
CHSH sum of expectation values obtained by averaging over the absurd events like (4.10) are not respected in the actual experiments.
[/quote]
.
[/quote]
I am sorry Richard, but I have to agree with Joy that this is absolute nonsense. Of course, Bell meant the use of counterfactual reasoning.
[/quote]
Joy's absurd story has got absolutely nothing to do with Bell's theorem. Bell (I refer to the mature Bell of the later works in his book "Speakable and unspeakable") made some physical assumptions, nowadays called locality, realism, and no-conspiracy. He expressed those assumptions in a mathematical form. Physicists and philosophers may debate whether or not this mathematical expression of physical and metaphysical concepts is reasonable. But once done, it is done, we may proceed with a mathematical analysis of the mathematical model which we now have before us. This is the familiar mathematical model with functions A, B and a probability measure rho with the familiar properties. From that, elementary calculus leads to the CHSH inequality. No "counterfactual reasoning" in the sense sometimes given to that phrase by philosophers is used.
Joy has given you a straw man. He confuses the issue by using an idiosyncratic definition of mean value, different from Bell's and different from modern physicists', and gets himself into a mess entirely of his own creation. (Von Mises' axiomatisation of probability was shown to have self-contradictions by Paul Lévy's student Ville in 1939, and it was superseded by Kolmogorov's 1933 measure-theoretic framework).
Meanwhile, counterfactual reasoning has had a renaissance in the modern theory of causality (led by Judea Pearl and many others). The words no longer mean what they meant decades ago in philosophy. They refer to a mathematical framework for discussing causality which is used every day in modern science. The latest Nobel prize in economics went to econometrician Guido Imbens (originally for the Netherlands) who has been promoting modern counterfactual reasoning in order to estimate/predict the effect of interventions in the economy by state actors.
Meanwhile, I checked the printer's proofs of my IEEE Access paper, commenting on Joy's first IEEE Access paper. It should be appearing very soon, and Joy really ought to get to work on a "Reply".
I'm expecting a final decision on my RSOS comment very soon. The editors have apologised for some delay due to Corona issues in London.
I guess I will soon stop following the discussions in Fred's forum. My work is done here. I will maybe get back into action when I notice some kind of journal publication (or attempt thereof) of Fred's simulation model.